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Abstract 
A notion of coherence is fonnulated for prediction problems. It provides 
a simple criterion which we believe every predictive inference should satisfy. 
Coherent predictions and predictive inferences are characterized and numerous 
examples of coherent and incoherent prediction are presented. 
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q. Introduction 
A prediction, as defined in this paper, consists of an assignment of 
numerical weights to a collection of events which are associated with some 
observable phenomenon. Various ways to evaluate predictions are discussed 
in section 1. In particular, we introduce a minimal requirement for a 
reasonable prediction: that it be coherent. Coherence hinges on an inter-
pretation of the numerical weights as degrees of belief; in this context, a 
coherent prediction is one that is free of internal inconsistencies and 
does not contradict the predicter's beliefs about the phenomenon whose 
outcome he seeks to predict. 
If two observations are to be made in sequence,_a conditional prediction 
about the second given the first is called a predictive inference. In 
section 2, the criterion of coherence is extended to predictive inferences. 
Coherent predictive inferences are characterized in section 3: essentially, 
they arise as predictive distributions calculated from finitely additive 
prior distributions defined on the set of possible states of nature, as 
specified by the predicter. A general form of the Bayes algorithm for 
predictive inference is studied in section 4. The algorithm always results 
in coherent predictions when it applies, but not every coherent prediction 
can be made using it. Section 5 treats a technical question which arises in 
the theory. Throughout the paper are examples of coherent and incoherent 
prediction. In particular, it is shown that a frequently used "estimative 
method of prediction"., as discussed in [1] and [2], can lead to incoherent 
prediction. 
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1. Evaluating predictions 
Consider an investigator who samples ten units from a population and 
observes the value of a numerical characteristic X on each unit. He plans 
to sample an additional unit and wishes to predict the value of x11• His 
prediction should depend upon his prior knowledge of the population and 
upon the values he has already observed. In addition, he wants the prediction 
to make explicit his uncertainty about x11 without committing him to 
opinions he does not hold. For example, he may consider x11 to be equally 
likely to fall into any of the 11 intervals into which the first 10 observa-
tions partition the real line, but he may not care to venture an opinion 
about whether x11 is as likely to be between X(lO) and 2X(lO) as it is 
to be larger than 2X(lO). 
Thus, a prediction about a future observation X specifies 
1) a set X whose elements are the possible values of X, 
2) a class D of subsets of X, whose elements are the events about 
whose occurrence the predicter is willing to speculate, and 
3) a real-valued function p with domain D, whose value, p(A), 
assigned to the event A, measures the predicter's belief that A 
will occur. (The function p is called a prediction function or 
sometimes just a prediction.) 
Suppose two observations are taken sequentially: for example, the first 
observation might be (X1,•••,x10) and the second x11 as above. A 
predictive inference associates with each value of the first observation, a 
prediction about the value of the second. The remainder of this section 
deals with the simpler notion of prediction; predictive inference is treated 
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in the next section. 
Predictions may be evaluated~ priori (before the observation) or ex 
post facto. Although this paper is concerned only with.!. priori evaluation 
of predictions, it may be useful to distinguish between the two types of 
evaluations with the following example. Suppose someone predicts the 
outcomes of 20 basketball games. Clearly, it is a priori unreasonable to 
say "team A is more likely to win game 1 than is its opponent, team B " , 
and to say "team B is more likely to win game 1 than is team A':'. However 
this pair of statements is translated into a quantitative prediction, the 
resulting prediction is bad--regardless of the outcome of the game. On the 
other hand, there is nothing a priori wrong with the prediction: "team A 1 
is very likely to win game 1, team A2 is very likely to win game 2 ,- -· •· • ··, and 
team A20 is very likely to win game 20"; but if each of the teams A1 ,···,A20 
lose their respective games, the prediction looks bad ex post facto. The 
predicter whose predictions turn out to be bad after the observation is 
somehow out of touch with the forces in the world which generate the observa-
tion. The predicter whose predictions are bad~ priori has not misunderstood· 
the world so much as he has contradicted himself. 
The prediction that favored both team A and its opponent team B 
contained within itself antagonistic statements. There is another way in 
which a prediction can be bad!! priori: it can contradict what the predicter 
knows, before the observation, about how the observation is generated. For 
example, suppose an experimenter plans to take two successive measurements 
of some physical constant, using the same apparatus for both measurements. 
Suppose he believes that the measurements will be physically independent of 
each other. Then a prediction that "the second observation is likely to be 
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greater than the first" is inconsistent with his beliefs about the experiment 
and is, for him, a bad prediction~ priori.· 
More generally, the predicter may be willing to specify a collection of 
possible states of the world, each of which provides a description of the 
stochastic mechanism generating the observation and one of which is assumed 
actually to obtain. Formally, there is a set 0 whose elements index 
distributions on the set of possible observations X. The distribution 
indexed by a is written If the predicter knew the state of the world 
to be e, he would choose his prediction function p to agree with n0 • 
In the example of the previous paragraph, the experimenter might believe 
that his apparatus produced normal measurement errors with known variance 
and that successive measurements resulted in independent errors. The value 
8 of the physical constant, if known, would then determine the prediction 
of the measurements. In particular, the prediction that "the second is 
likely to be larger than the first" is inconsistent with every n8 the 
experimenter is willing to entertain. Thus the prediction looks bad whatever 
a obtains. Such predictions will be deemed a priori unacceptable according 
to the criterion of coherence defined below. It should be noted that a 
prediction which is not thus unacceptable need not be attractive, but it is 
hard to imagine anyone opting for a prediction which looks bad irt any 
conceivable light! 
The notion of coherence relies upon a particular operational interpre-
tation, due to de Finetti, of the measure of belief incorporated in the 
prediction function p. According to that interpretation, $p(A) is the 
price at which the predicter is neutral between buying and selling a ticket 
which is worth $1 if A occurs, nothing otherwise. This interpretation 
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attaches economic consequences to belief and opens the possibility that some 
assessments of belief can imply economic misfortune, if the operational 
meaning of the assessments were to be implemented. Here are two examples 
which illustrate how this works. 
Example 1.1. Let A be the event that team A wins game 1 and let B be the 
event that team B wins. The statement that "team A is more likely to win 
game 1 than team B" implies a prediction which assigns some number bigger 
than 1/2 to A--say p(A) = .7. Similarly, the statement that team Bis 
favored gets converted into a prediction like p(B) = .8. Now use the 
de Finetti measure to bring out the contradiction implicit in favoring both 
teams: a gambler can sell the predicter a ticket on A for 70¢ and a ticket 
on B for 80¢; the predicter has paid out $1.50 against a sure gain of $1, 
so that he faces a net loss of 50¢ regardless of whether A or B occurs. 
Formally, in this example X = {A,B}, D = {{A},{B}}, and p is as 
specified above. The set 0 and distributions n8 on X can be chosen 
arbitrarily (but see the discussion of "black-box" prediction which concludes 
this section.) 
Example 1.2. Consider the repeated measurement example discussed above. 
Let D be the collection of Borel subsets of and 0 = R, 
where a indexes the bivariate normal distribution with mean (8,8) and 
covariance I. Further, let A= {(x1 ,x2): x2 > x1}. The statement that 
the second observation is likely to be greater than the first translates 
into a prediction like p(A) = .7. Suppose a gambler requires the predicter 
to buy a ticket on A for 70¢. Let L be the net loss in dollars to the 
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predicter from this gamble. Then, whatever is the value 8 of the physical 
constant in question, 
That is, if the predicter knew the actual state of -the world, he would be 
neutral, before the measurements, between paying 20¢ to forego this gamble 
and letting the gamble proceed. Now he does not know the actual value for· 
8, but as he surveys each acknowledged candidate in turn, he finds himself 
facing the same 20¢ deficit. This is the unsatisfactory economic consequence 
which the de Finetti measure associates with this prediction and which then 
exposes its a priori unacceptability. 
Generalizing from these two examples, we can now define coherent 
prediction. Suppose a predicter has specified a prediction (X,D,p) and 
a set 0 indexing probability distributions which are defined on a 
collection of subsets of X which includes those sets in D. A gambler 
can place a bet with the predicter by specifying 
i) a positive integer 
ii) n elements of D, 
n· 
' 
say A •· • • A • l' ' n' 
iii) n real numbers, say c1,-•••,cn. 
For each x EX, this bet is worth, to the gambler, 
(1.1) L(x) n = L • l c. [A. (x) - p (A
1
. ) ] 
1= 1 1 
(Here and below we follow de Finetti's convention of identifying a set A 
with its indicator function A(x) which equals 1 for x in A and 0 
otherwise.) 
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Definition 1.1. A predicter and his prediction function p are coherent if 
it is impossible to place a bet L such that 
(1.2) 
A prediction is incoherent if it is not coherent. 
If a prediction is incoherent according to this definition, then for 
any finite amount of cash $c, there is a bet available to the gambler such 
that, for every state of the world 8, the predicter, evaluating his prospects 
before the observation as though he believed 8 to obtain, would be willing 
to pay the gambler $c to call off their bet. This would not be the case 
if (1.2) were replaced in the definition by 
(1.3) E8 (L) > 0 for all 0. 
In fact, a predicter might, with little trepidation, face a bet for which 
(1.3), but not (1.2), held if he assigned essentially no probability to the 
actual state of the world being one of the e's for which E
0
(L) > £ for 
arbitrarily small, positive £. This partially explains our choice of (1.2) 
rather than (1.3). (See de Finetti's discussion in [4], section 3.11.4, 
especially A_lc.) 
Coherent predictions are characterized in Theorem 3.1 in section 3: a 
prediction function p is coherent if and only if there is a finitely additive 
probability measure y defined on subsets of 0 such that 
(1.4) p(A) = f n0 (A)y(d8) 
for all A in D. One consequence is that a coherent p is consistent with 
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a finitely additive probability measure on X. 
The rest of this section treats "black-box" prediction problems in 
which the predicter has only vague knowledge of the mechanism generating 
the observations, and is, consequently, unwilling to attempt to specify a 
structured model incorporating possible states of the world and corresponding 
distributions. There are two quite different approaches possible. The first 
is to take 0 to be the collection of all probability distributions on X 
and 1T 8 to be 8 for every 8 in 0. The second is to ignore whatever 
stochastic structure may be present in the state of the world and to consider 
only the observations themselves. Formally, 0 can be identified with X 
and 1r 8 taken to be point mass at 8. Somewhat surprisingly, whichever of 
the two approaches is adopted, the coherent predictions turn out to be the 
same. (The reason is that the infimum in (1.1) is the same when 8 is 
restricted to be an extreme point in the convex set of all possible distri-
butions.) So, for our purposes, there is no harm in taking the conceptually 
simpler deterministic approach and we will do so from now on. 
Now if 8 is point mass at x, then E8L is just L(x) and definition 
1.1 says that a prediction is coherent if there is no bet for the gambler 
which results in a gain larger than some positive constant whatever is the 
value x of the observation. (Example 1.1 above illustrates how a gambler 
can obtain such an L from an incoherent p.) Thus, in the case of black-
box prediction, our definition of coherence agrees with that given by 
de Finetti ([4], section 3.3.5). His definition seems to us inadequate when 
the predicter is willing to posit a highly structured statistical model as 
in Example 1.2; the definition must incorporate this additional structure. 
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In.the case of black-box prediction, Theorem 3.1 specializes to the 
statement that a prediction p is coherent if and only if there is a finitely 
additive probability measure y defined on subsets of 0 which agrees with 
p on every set in D. This is just de Finetti's famous coherence theorem. 
{For a formal statement, see Heath and Sudderth (9].) 
2. Predictive Inference 
Consider an investigator who plans to take two successive observations, 
X and Y. Before either observation is taken, he can have opinions about: 
- how the observations will turn out, either separately or jointly; 
- the value of Y, conditional on what he observes X to be; 
- the nature of the stochastic mechanism which generates X and Y. 
Formally, he can express these opinions by specifying: 
(2.1) sets X and Y, whose elements represent the possible values 
of X and Y respectively; 
(2.2) a prediction about X and Y, consisting of a class E of 
subsets of X x Y and a prediction function µ defined on E• ,
(2.3) a predictive inference, consisting of, for each x in X, a 
class Dx of subsets of Y and a prediction function px 
defined on D . 
x' 
and 
(2.4) a set 0 
' 
whose elements index distributions on Xx Y. 
Call the distribution indexed by a, ~8• The set of ~8 •s may consist of 
all point masses on Xx Y, corresponding to black-box prediction; or they 
may determine a complete class of alternative stochastic models, corresponding 
to the modelling approach to prediction. 
The problem considered in this section is to determine criteria for the 
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objects specified in (2.1)-(2.4) above, in order to eliminate predictive 
inferences which are~ priori unreasonable. The following example shows 
that it is not enough simply to require that all the 
predictions, in the sense of definition 1.1. 
p 's be coherent 
X 
Example 2.1. Suppose X = Y = 0 = R, and under the distribution indexed 
by e, X and Y are independent N(S,l) random variables. That is, if 
e were known, the predicter would use the N(S,l) distribution as his 
prediction function on Borel subsets of Y, regardless of the observed 
value of X. Now suppose the predicter uses the following estimative 
method of prediction: having observed x, he will estimate e by the 
maximum likelihood estimate, x, and then he will use the N(x, 1) distri-
bution to predict Y on the Borel subsets of Y. Each prediction function 
px comprising this predictive inference is coherent, by Theorem 3.1 (with 
D the Borel subsets of Y, and y point-mass at x). According to this 
predictive inference, the predicter assesses the probability that Y will 
differ from the observation x by less than one in absolute value as 0.68, 
whatever x is observed. On the other hand, no matter which e obtains 
as actual state of the world, X - Y has a N(0,2) distribution, so the 
probability that X and Y differ by less than one in absolute value is 
0.52. Thus, the predictive inference contradicts the information about the 
joint generation of the two observations which the predicter specified in 0. 
Note: Undoubtedly, very few statisticians would be tempted to emulate 
the predicter in this example. Yet, the general estimative method of 
prediction, which consists of using observed data to estimate parameters 
which are then inserted into a specified family of sampling distributions 
for future observations, is routinely used in more complicated situations, 
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for example in classification or reliability theory. See [1] and [2] for 
some discussion on this point. 
To use de Finetti's belief measure to evaluate predictive inferences, 
it is necessary to exercise some care in formulating the rules which attach 
the economic consequences to expressed opinions. The key question is: 
when does money change hands? Since the aim is to evaluate the whole 
scheme of a predictive inference, the predicter must reveal the scheme--that 
is, specify (2.lh-(2.4) above--before either X or Y is observed. Once 
the predictions are announced, they become the basis of a book which the 
imaginary gambler will try to exploit. If the economic metaphor is to 
retain its operational character, the gambler must be restricted to a finite 
number of cash transactions with the predicter. Cash transactions begin 
when the stake covering a bet is paid over, and this payment need not occur 
until the bet becomes operative. Bets based upon the prediction function 
µ are operative before either observation is taken (representing, as they 
do, opinions operative at this time), but bets based upon px are operative 
only if--and hence, not until--x is observed. Thus, cash transactions for 
bets based upon the predictive inference p are initiated only after the 
first observation has been taken. Hence, an allowable bet consists of the. 
specification of 
(2.5) an integer n, sets A· • • • A in 1' ' n E, and real numbers 
(2.6) for each x in X, an integer n(x), sets B1 (x),···,Bn(x)(x) 
in Dx, and real numbers b1 (x),•••,bn(x)(x). 
After both X and Y have been observed, the bet specified in (2.5) and 
(2.6) is worth, to the gambler in dollars, 
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(2. 7) L(x,y) 
Prospectively, the predicter faces a loss of E8 (L) on this bet, if 8 
describes the actual state of the world. 
Definition 2.1. The prediction µ and predictive inference p are coherent 
if there is no allowable bet L, as specified in (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7) 
above, such that 
Predictions µ and p which are not coherent are incoherent. In particular, 
if the domain E of µ is empty, the predictive inference p can be called 
coherent, or incoherent, depending on whether it satisfies the condition of 
definition 2. 1. 
Example 2.1 revisited. To show that the predictive inference described in 
Example 2.1 is incoherent, have the gambler contract to sell a ticket on the 
interval B(x) = {y: x- 1 < y < x+ l} if x is observed, for each x in 
x. Such a ticket costs p (B(x)) = 68¢, 
-~~- -- ---- - - -~-
regardless of x, and so, if L 
represents the gambler:'s winnings in dollars from the consequent transaction, 
E8(L) = -E8[B(x)(y) - px(B(x))] 
= .68 ~0 r1x YI< 11 
= .68 .52 
= .16. 
In summary, when this example was first introduced, we pointed to an 
antagonism between the probability model and the predictive inference. This 
antagonism has been captured here as a contract which, before either observa-
ti.on i.s taken, the predicter would willingly pay 16¢ to void, whateve.r the. 
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actual state of the world •. 
The main result of this paper is Theorem 3.2, which characterizes 
coherent predictive inferences. According to this theorem, a coherent 
predictive inference must be consistent with some inference assessed as 
follows: first, the predicter selects a finitely additive probability 
distribution y on 0· 
' 
then, he calculates µ as an average-of the 1T 's e 
with averaging measure y; finally, p must be a posterior predictive 
distribution for Y, based upon the prior y and the A formal 
description of this method of developing predictive inferences is given 
in the next section. Some problems associated with its application are 
discussed in sections 4 and 5. The remainder of this section is devoted 
to two examples which illustrate some implications of this theorem. 
Example 2.2. Consider the investigator introduced at the.beginning of 
section 1. He has sampled 10 units from a population and has observed 
their x-values: x1 ,:•••,x1O • He plans to sample an additional unit and 
wants first to predict its x-value. Suppose he knows the size of the 
population: n, an integer greater than 10. Suppose also that the 
numerical characteristic x can be measured so accurately that the 
investigator can disregard the possibility that any two units in the 
population have identical x-values. 
In this example, 
y = R 
where a in 0 specifies the x-values of the entire population, and n0 
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is the distribution on R11 induced by sampling eleven coordinates of 8 
at random without replacement. 
In section 1, we reported the prediction that x11 ·is equally likely 
to fall into each of the intervals into which the observed values x1 ,•••,x10 
partition the real line. Call this predictive inference the Fisher-Hill 
inference, since Fisher [7] and Hill [11] advocated it, from the fiducial 
and the subjective Bayesian point of view respectively. The inference has 
a great deal of intuitive appeal, when information about the population of 
x-values is extremely vague. 
Formally, the Fisher-Hill inference specifies: for (x1 ,•••,x10) in 
RlO D 
' (x1, • • • ,x10) consists of the·intervals described above, and 
p(x
1
, •• •,xio) assigns probability 1/11 to each of these intervals. 
Theorem 3.2 allows us to conclude that the Fisher-Hill inference is coherent 
(see Example 4.7 of this paper for a derivation). The role of the prior 
probability distribution required by the theorem can be played by any Hill 
model on as introduced and discussed in [14]. Moreover, the Fisher-
Hill inference is the only coherent inference, with the D's as described 
above, which assigns probabilities to the intervals in D which do not 
depend on the particular values of x1 ,•••,x10 • This follows from the 
fact that, for all e in 0 , x11 has the same chance of occupying each of 
the intervals where are the 
order statistics corresponding to the sample x1 ,•••,x10 . 
Can the Fisher-Hill inference be extended coherently to a full predictive 
distribution for x11 , at least on the interval 
suppose D consists of the intervals (xl, • • •, xlO) 
as well as all the Borel subsets of the interval 
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(x(l)'x(lO))? That is: 
(-
00
,x(l)) and (x(l0)' 00) 
(x(l)'x(lO)). Is there 
a coherent p on D which, f or each possible value of the first ten 
observations, gives equal probability to the intervals ( - 00 ,x(l)),···,(x(l0)' 00)? 
We conjecture a negative answer to this question. (Note : this question is 
mathematically related to whether or not there exists a strat egic Hill model 
for n > 2. ) 
Example 2 . 3 . Conglomer ability and coherence . 
Suppose the predi cter foregoes modelling, and l ets 0 be the set of 
point masses on Xx Y. Then his predictions µ and p are incoherent only 
if there exists an all owable bet under which he suffers a sure loss of $c 
(for some c > 0), regardless of which x and y are observed. Corol l aries 
3. 2 and 3 . 3 characterize which black box predictions µ and p a re coherent, 
under some regularity conditions on their domains: essentia lly, µ must be 
conglomerable with r espect to the X margi n, with conditionals on 
Y given by p. That is, for C in the domain of µ, µ(C) = fp (C )µ 1 (dx) , X X 
where is the x-marginal of µ, and C (y) = C(x,y) . 
X 
Some subjectivists, us ing de Finetti ' s definit i on of coherence, have 
argued against r eq uiring conglomerability for distri butions over product 
spaces . An excellent presentation of this argument may be found in [12), 
around the fol lowing example: an inves tigator is to observe a · point on the 
surface of the spher e . Suppose he first learns its l atitude (X), then its 
longitude (Y). Suppose he selects for his prediction function µ, the 
uniform distribut i on on the Borel sets of the surface of the sphere, and for 
his predic tive inference p, the uniform distribution for longitude, 
whatever be the observed latitude. As is well known (see [13), p. 50), 
p is not a µ- conditional distribution on Y. According to our Corollary 
3 . 2 , then, in contradistinction t o Hill ' s position, it is not coherent. 
- 15 -
(There is no problem of finite addi tivity here because all the distributions 
are countably additive . ) 
Thus, as a consequence of Theorem 3 .1 and Corollary 3.2, we can conclude 
the following : if the predicter plans t o predict Y after X is obser ved , 
his prior prediction for (X , Y) mus t be conglomerable ; but if he foregoes 
predicting X and Y sequential ly , and instead merely predic t s the single 
observation (X,Y), he may selec t a nonconglomerable di s tribution if he 
chooses . The tools depend on the t ask . 
Example 2.4. Re turn to the setting of Example 2 . 1 : X = Y = 0 = R; and , 
given 0 , X and Y are i ndependent N(0 ,l) r andom var i ables . The formal 
Bayes a l gorithm fo r computing a posterior from an improper prior can be used 
to generate a predictive inference as follows : with Lebesgue measur e as 
improper prior on 0 
' 
the fo rmal posterior on 0 gi ven X is N(x, l ); 
integrating the mar ginal distribution of Y given 0 against this posterior 
leads t o a N(x , 2) predicti ve di stribution for Y given x . This predictive 
distribution i s coherent , for r easons gi ven in Example 4 . 2. 
3. The Coherence Theorems . 
Two theorems wi l l be proved. The first characterizes coherent predictions 
of a singl e obser vat i on and the second charac t erizes coherent predi ct i ve 
infer ences. For the stat ement of the first t heorem, let 0 and X be non-
empty sets and let D be a collection of subsets of X. The predi ction 
func tion p is a mapping from D to the real numbers. Assume also that, 
for each e in 0 , is a probability measure on X. (By a pr obability 
meas ure A on~ set S is meant a finitely additive probabi li t y meas ure 
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defined on all subsets of S. In practice, A will often be defined only 
on some subalgebra of subsets of S, but can always be extended to all 
subsets by an application of the Hahn-Banach Theorem. The extension need 
not be unique, but this causes no difficulty in most applications of the 
theorems.) 
Let E be the collection of all functions of the form 
F(8) = E8(L) 
where L is a function as given in (1.1) and E8 denotes integration with 
respect to ~8• Let P be the cone of bounded, real-valued functions on 
0 which have a positive infimum. Here is a restatement of definition 1.1. 
Definition 3.1. p is coherent if E and P are disjoint. 
Theorem 3.1. A prediction function p on a class D of subsets of X is 
coherent if and only if there is a probability measure y on 0 such that 
(3.1) p(A) = J~8 (A)y(d8) 
for every A in D. 
Proof: Assume p is coherent. E is a linear space and P is convex with 
nonempty interior. The separating hyperplane theorem (see, for example, 
[10, Lemma 1)) implies that there is a probability measure y on 0 which 
annihilates E. In particular, if A is in D, L = A - p(A), and 
for 8 in 0 , then 
0 = f F dy = J ~8 (A)y(d8) - p(A). 
Conversely, assume (3.1) holds. Then, for L as in (1.1) and 
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= 0 • 
Hence, the infimum of F cannot be positive.a 
The right-hand-side of (3.1) defines a probability measure on X. Thus 
it follows from the theorem that a coherent prediction function is a partial 
measure in the following sense. 
Definition 3.2. A function B defined on a collection D of subsets of a 
set X is a partial measure on X if there is a probability measure B on 
X which agrees with B on D. 
Corollary 3.1. A coherent prediction function is a partial measure. 
It will be convenient to have a simple notion of integration for partial 
measures. Let B be a partial measure on D, and let D* be the linear 
space spanned by the constant functions and indicator functions of sets in 
D. For f in D*, the integral of f with respect to B is just the 
integral of f with respect to any extensi'on B. The integral is written 
ffdB or B(f)~ 
The rest of this section deals with predictive inference. So it is now 
assumed that 0, X, and Y are nonempty sets and that, for every e in 
0 
' 
1T 8 is a probability measure on X x Y. As in section 2, µ is a 
prediction function on Xx Y and p is now a predictive inference. The 
condition for the coherence, in the sense of definition 1.1, of the prediction 
functions µ and all the p's has been established in Theorem 3.1. 
X 
So, 
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in view of Corollary 3.1, there is no serious loss in generality if all 
these prediction functions are assumed to be partial measures. Specifically, 
it is assumed that 
a) µ is a partial measure on XxY with domain E, and 
b) for every X in X, PX is a partial measure on y with domain 
D . 
X 
Here is another description of the class of betting functions introduced 
in section 2: Let E be a a-field of subsets of XX Y. Then let A be 
the collection of all bounded, real-valued, E-measurable functions on Xx Y 
of the form 
g(x,y) 
where, for every x, n(x) is a positive integer, and, for every x and 
i, Ai is in D and c.(x) 
X X 1 
is a real number. Next let B be the 
collection of all bounded, real-valued, 1:-measurable functions on Xx Y 
of the form 
h(x,y) n i i = Ei=l ci [A (x,y) - µ(A ) ] 
where every Ai is in E and every is a real number. Finally, let 
C be the collection of all functions of the form 
(3.2) 
where L = g + h for some g in A and h in B and E8 denotes.integration 
with respect to n8 • As it was above, P is the cone of bounded, uniformly 
positive functions on 0. The following is a restatement of Definition 2.1. 
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Definition 3.3. p and µ are coherent if C and P are disjoint. 
If y is a probability measure on 
measure on X x Y given by 
0 , y O 1T is the probability 
yo ,r(A) = J 1r 8 (A)y(d8) 
for every subset A of X x Y. 
Definition 3.4. p is an A-predictive distribution for yo ,r if, for 
every g in A, 
(3. 3) yo ,r(g) = J p (g )m(dx) 
X X 
where m is the yo ,r-marginal on X and gx(y) = g(x,y). 
This definition reduces to the usual definition of conditional or 
predictive distribution when every D 
X 
is the same a-field 
of Y and I: = F x G for some a-field F of subsets of X. 
G of subsets 
Theorem 3.2. µ and p are coherent if and only if there is a probability 
measure y on 0 such that 
i) y o ,r extends µ, and 
ii) p is an A-predictive distribution for y o ,r. 
Proof: Suppose µ and p are coherent. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, 
it follows from the separating hyperplane theorem that there is a probability 
measure y on 0 which annihilates C. In particular, for g in A, 
yo,r(g) = J E8 (g)y(d8) = 0 
because G(S) = E8 (g) is in C. But, as is easily checked, p .{:g ) = 0 X X 
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1 
for every x. Hence, (3.3) follows and, with it, condition (ii). 
Next suppose B is in E. Set h = B - µ (B) and H( e) = E8 (h). Then 
H is in C· , so 
0 = y(H) = yo ,r(B) - µ(B) 
and (i) holds. 
Conversely, suppose y exists satisfying (i) and (ii). Let F be a 
member of C as specified in (3.2). Then 
y(F) = yo ,r(L) = yo ,r(g) + yo ,r(h). 
Because of (ii) and the fact that px(gx) is zero for every x, 
y O ,r(g) = J p (g )m(dx) = 0. X X 
Because of (i), 
y O 1T (h) = µ (h) = 0. 
Thus y(F) is zero and F cannot belong to P.a 
The use of the separating hyperplane theorem is by now a fairly standard 
technique for proving coherence results. As far as we know, it was first 
introduced in a similar context by Freedman and Purves [8] whose Theorem 4 
is a special case of Theorem 3.2. 
The rest of this section applies Theorem 3.2 to the case of black-box 
predictive inference. Here 0 is X x Y and 
(x,y). Hence, for any measure y on 0 , y O 1T 
1T (x,y) is point mass at 
is just y on Xx Y. 
Also, the collection C of functions defined in (3.2) is just the linear 
span of the collections A and B. So the condition for coherence of p 
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and µ becomes: there is no pair of functions g in A and h in B 
such that L = g + h is bounded away from zero·. 
Let F and B be a-fields of subsets of X and Y respectively. 
Corollary 3. 2. Suppose the domain of µ is F x G and suppose that, for 
every x, the domain of is G. Assume also that the mapping x-+ p (A ) 
X X 
is F-measurable for every A in F x G. Then the black-box predictions 
µ and p are coherent if and only if, for every A in F x G, 
(3.4) µ(A) = f p (A )µ 1 (dx) X X 
where is the marginal of µ on X. (That is, µ and p are coherent 
if and only if µ is strategic with conditional distribution p.) 
Proof: If µ and p are coherent, then (3.4) follows from conditions (i) 
and (ii) of Theorem 3.2. Conversely, suppose (3.4) holds for every A in 
F X G. Let be an extension of to a probability measure on all subsets 
of X and, for every X in X, be an extension of to a 
probability measure on all subsets of Y. Define the measure y on X x Y 
by the formula 
for bounded, real-valued functions g on Xx Y. It is easy to verify 
conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3.2.a 
The result just stated is a general version of the law of total 
probability for coherent predictive inferenees. De Finetti established 
such a result for finite partitions [4, section 4.7]. However, his notion 
of coherence is too weak to imply the general result. He allows for bets 
conditional on events in a fixed finite partition while our Definition 2.1 
permits bets conditional on the value of the first observation of the 
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variable X which may have an infinity of possible values. 
The next result is another version of the law of total probability 
when predictions are made about X and Y separately but not jointly. 
Corollary 3.3. Suppose the domain of µ consists of all sets of the form 
A x Y and X x B for A in F, B in B, and suppose the domain of every 
is G. Assume also that the ~pping x+p (B) 
X 
is F-measurable for 
every x in X. Then the black-box predictions µ and p are coherent 
if and only if, for every B in G, 
where and are the marginals of µ on X and Y respectively. 
Proof: Similar to that of Corollary 3.2.a 
To conclude this section, we point out that Theorem 1 of (1O]--the 
result characterizing coherent inference about 0 based upon an observation 
X--is closely related to Theorem 3.2 mathematically and can be derived from 
Theorem 3.2 by setting 0 equal to Y. Philosophically, the two theorems 
are quite different because the prediction theorem treats observables X 
and Y while the result of (10] is concerned with inference about 8, which 
may be unobservable. The present approach seems closer to the spirit, if 
not the letter, of de Finetti's work. 
4. The Bayes algorithm for predictive inference 
Suppose that each n8 has a density with respect to some countably 
additive, a-finite measure on Xx Y and, in addition, suppose that the 
predicter holds opinions about the actual state of nature which can be 
expressed as a countably additive proper prior on 0. Then he can construct 
a predictive distribution for Y as follows: using Bayes' Theorem, he 
computes a posterior on 0 given x and then integrates the conditional 
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distribution for Y given 9 and x against t his posterior . (A c lear 
discussion whi ch i s rich with examples i s in Chapter 2 o f [2] . ) The next 
result s t a tes that this t echni que always yields a coherent predictive 
inference so l ong as the posterior distribution for 0 given x and the 
condit i onal distribution for Y given e and x exist. The 7f I S e need 
not have densities and neither they nor y need be countably addit i ve . 
It is tempting t o conjecture tha t every coherent predictive inference 
arises in this fashion. An example will be given t o show this is not true. 
The se tting is the same as that for Theorem 3 .2 . Ass ume that t he 
a- field r on Xx Y i s the product F x G of a - fields F on X a nd G 
on Y. Suppose also that the measures 1r 9 are strategic on r ; that i s , 
if i s the marginal on X, there is a family 
measures on Y such that 
2 
1T e , x of probab i lity 
for every bounded, real- valued, [ -meas urable g . In particular, this wi l l 
be the case when each ir 8 is countably additive, and X and Y are 
standard Borel spaces, as is usual in statistical applications . Next, let 
y be a probability measure on 0 a nd suppose that qx is a pos terior for 
y on 0 given x in the sense that 
ff <j>(9 , x)q (d9)m( dx) 
X 
1 
= ff <j>(9,x)ire(dx)y(d9) 
for every bounded, real- valued , Ex F- measurable <P , where E i s a fixed 
a- field on 0 
' 
and m is the y O 1T ma r ginal on X. 
For X in X and A in G, define 
2 (4 . 1) p (A) = f ,re (A)q (d9) . 
X , X X 
Theorem 4 .1. p is an A- predic tive distribution for y O 1T (in the sense 
of definition 3.4) and, in particular, p is coheren t. 
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Proof: For g in A, 
f p (g )m(dx) = ff 1r28 (g )q (d0)m(dx) X X ,x X X 
= ff 1r20 (g )1r
1
0 (dx)y(de) ,x X 
= y O 1r(g) • 
This proves the first assertion. The second follows from Theorem 3.2 if µ 
is taken to have empty domain.a 
Not every coherent p arises from a posterior q as in (4.1). This 
is because not every prior y has a posterior. Here is an example. 
Example 4.1. Return to the sampling problem described at the beginning of 
section 1 and taken up in example 2.2. Suppose the Bayesian predicter 
selects a symmetric product measure y on R11 which is a Hill model as 
explained in [14, section 4]. It is easy to verify that the Fisher-Hill 
predictive inference is a predictive distribution in the sense of definition 
3.4 and is, therefore, coherent by Theorem 3.2. However, the measure y is 
not strategic and does not yield a posterior on 0 given (x1,•••,x10). 
(A proof of this can be based on results in [3] and [15].) Thus (4.1) does 
not apply. 
There are some interesting situations where (4.1) works even for 
finitely additive priors. Here is one such. 
Example 4.2. Suppose that 0 = X = G, a locally compact, amenable group 
and assume that is a tight translation family so that Theorem 3 of 
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[10] can be applied to yield a posterior q when y is a group invariant 
probability measure on 0. Then formula (4.1) can be used to calculate a 
coherent predictive ·inference p. If the measures n! have densities with 
respect to left Haar measure h on G and Bayes formula is used to 
calculate a formal posterior for h, it turns out to be the same posterior 
q as that obtained from the proper, finitely additive prior y. So h 
leads to the same predictive inference p also. 
As a special case, consider Example 2.1 where X = Y = 0 = R and, 
given e, X and Y are independent N(8,l). Here h is Lebesgue measure 
and the formal Bayes algorithm gives qx, the posterior on 0 given x, 
to be N(x,1). Formula (4.1) then gives the predictive distribution px 
as N(x,2). (Notice n28 is N(8,l).) ,x 
In a nice setting like that of Example 2.1, any improper prior can be 
inserted into Bayes' formula and may result in a proper posterior which can, 
in turn, be inserted into (4.1) to give a predictive inference. Not all 
such inferences need be coherent. It is easy to modify the examples of 
Stone [16] or Example 5.2 of [10] to get incoherent predictive inferences 
from improper, countably additive priors. 
5. Black-box prediction and strategic measures 
Suppose a black-box predicter allows D to vary with x, instead 
X 
of making conditional assessments on a fixed cr-field as in Corollary 3.1. 
It would no longer make sense to describe a measure on X x Y as strategic 
with conditionals P, since each is only a partial measure with 
domain D. However, the following is a natural generalization of the 
X 
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notion of a strategic measure. 
Definition 5. 1. Suppose y is a probability measure on Xx Y. Then y 
is D- s trategic with conditionals p if, fo r each subset A of Xx Y 
such that A is in D for all x, 
X X 
(5 .1) y(A) = f p (A )y
1
(dx) 
X X 
where is the X-marginal of y. 
Ba sed upon Corollary 3 . 2 , one might conje~ture that µ and p are 
coherent if and only if there is a probability measure y on X x Y which 
extends µ and is D-stra t egic with condi tionals p . If µ and p are 
coherent , then Theorem 3 . 2 implies that s uch a y mus t exist . However, the 
f ollowing exampl e shows t ha t the converse i f false. 
Exampl e 5. 1. Let X = Y = N, the set of nonnegative integers. Let U 
be the set of above-diagonal elements of Xx Y: 
U = {(m,n): m ~ n, m E N, n EN}. 
Let L = Uc and make the following assignments: 
E = {U,XxY}, µ(U) =O, µ(XxY ) = l; 
D = {{y}: y E L }U{Y} , p (Y) = 1 , p {y} = 0 
X X X X 
for a ll (x,y) in L. 
Then µ and p are incoherent. For a gambler can take a f ree ticket on 
U and , conditional on whatever x is ob served, free ticke ts on 
{l} ,···, {x} , thereby winning $1 for s ure with no cash outlay . 
Next let and y 2 be probability measures on X and Y, 
r espectively, and suppose both measures a re diffuse in the sense that they 
- 27 -
0 
• 
assign measure zero to every singleton. Let y be the (reverse strategic) 
measure on X x Y defined by 
for ACX X y and where Ay(x) = A(x,y). 
Let A be a subset of XxY with A in D for every x. We wish 
X X 
to verify (5.1). Notice that, for every x, either A is a singleton or 
X 
A = Y. Thus 
X 
(5.3) 
Also 
(5.4) 
where A1 = {{x,y) EA: Ax= Y} and A2 = A - A1 • For each y in Y, 
Ay = {x: A = Y}. So, by (5.2), 1 X 
(5.5) 
Now A2 is contained in the graph of a function from X into Y and, by 
[6, Lennna 2], 
(5.6) 
It follows from (5.3), (5.4), (5.5), and (5.6) that y is D-strategic with 
conditionals p. 
Suppose that the gambler is limited to a finite number of bets, where 
the number does not depend on which x is observed. And in addition, 
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suppose he is limited to integral stakes, which are bounded in absolute value. 
That is, for some N, lc(x)I < N and n(x) < N, for all x in X. Then, 
the existence of a D-strategic y with conditionals p, which extends µ, 
is sufficient to guarantee coherence. For if A is any set in Y such that 
A is in D for each .x, and F = A - p (A), then 
X X X X X 
y(F) = y(A) - f p (A )dy (dx) 
X X X 
= o. 
So F cannot be uniformly positive. Also, by the limitations imposed on 
the stakes and the number of bets, the same conclusion can be drawn for the 
most general function representing the gambler's winnings, which is just a 
finite linear combination of such F. 
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